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  How	  do	  you	  locate	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  (1404–1440)—military	  figurehead,	  national	  hero,	  serial	   child-­‐killer,	   archetype	   of	   Bluebeard—in	   any	   cultural,	   historical,	   political	  imaginary,	   in	   any	   religious	   inscape	   that	   can	  make	   sense	   of	  what	   he	  was,	  warrior,	  homicidal	   maniac	   and	   despicable	   fool?	   This	   is	   precisely	   what	   Georges	   Bataille	  attempts	  in	  his	  essay	  ‘The	  Tragedy	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais’,	  where	  de	  Rais	  finds	  his	  place	  as	  a	   remnant	  of	   the	   collapsing	  world	  of	   the	   feudal	   seigneur,	   a	  world	  he	  had	  outlived,	  with	  its	  military	  reforms	  and	  complex	  ecclesiastical	  politics.	  De	  Rais’	  behaviour	  and	  fate	   is	  tied	  up	  in	  the	  reconfiguration	  of	  a	  wealth	  and	  prestige	  he	  had	  inherited	  and	  that	   he	   chose	   to	   squander,	   or	   that	   he	   squandered	   recklessly,	   mindlessly,	   without	  thinking	   enough	   to	   choose.	   He	   could	   do	  what	   he	   did	   because	   of	   the	   liberties	   and	  resources	  available	  to	  the	  medieval	  lord:	  the	  property,	  the	  wealth,	  the	  disposability	  of	  the	  plebeian	  masses	  (‘the	  little	  beggars	  whose	  throats	  he	  cut	  were	  worth	  no	  more	  than	   the	   horses’),1	   the	   stunning	   irresistibility	   of	   the	   spectacle	   of	   aristocratic	  indulgence	   (‘he	   gave	   way	   without	   measure	   to	   his	   need	   to	   astonish	   through	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magnificent	   fairytale	   expenditures’).2	   To	   Bataille,	   de	   Rais	   was	   a	   savage	   child,	   an	  animal:	  Joined	   to	   the	   god	   of	   sovereignty	   by	   initiatory	   rites,	   the	   young	   warriors	  willingly	  distinguished	  themselves	  in	  particular	  by	  a	  bestial	   ferocity;	  they	  knew	  neither	   rules	   nor	   limits.	   In	   their	   ecstatic	   rage,	   they	  were	   taken	   for	  wild	  animals,	  for	  furious	  bears,	  for	  wolves.3	  The	   career	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	   is	   caught	  up	   then	   in	   the	   rampant	   libertinage	  of	   feudal	  sovereignty,	   a	   sovereignty	  de	  Rais	   risks	   sovereignly,	  without	   regard	   for	   the	   future,	  for	  property,	  for	  lives,	  for	  his	  social	  and	  political	  place	  or	  eternal	  afterlife.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  unfolding	   of	   Bataille’s	   account	   of	   sovereignty	   that	   his	   story	   makes	   sense	   in	   its	  abandonment	   of	   sense,	   its	   extravagance,	   its	   determined,	   cruel,	   unnecessary	   and	  pointless	  waste.	  Yet,	  Gilles’	  fate	  is	  also	  wrapped	  up	  in	  the	  meaning	  of	  Christianity	  or,	  for	  Bataille,	  religion	  more	  generally,	  a	  religion	  Gilles	  embraced	  by	  spurning	  it	  in	  his	  toying	   with	   necromancy,	   but	   that	   nevertheless	   still	   governed	   his	   decisions,	   even	  when	  he	  was	   at	   his	  most	   insolent,	   and	   to	  which,	   in	   the	   end,	   as	   he	   approached	  his	  execution,	   he	   at	   least	   pretended	   to	   submit.	   About	   this	   religion,	   Bataille	   says	   in	   a	  telling	   aside:	   ‘It	   may	   be	   that	   Christianity	   would	   not	   want	   a	   world	   from	   which	  violence	  was	  excluded.’4	  	  What	  hypocrisy	  lurks	  in	  the	  will	  to	  denounce	  Christianity’s	  essential	  violence?	  A	   religion	  of	   sacrifice	   yes,	   but	   also	   of	   authority,	   repression	   and	  damnation	   cast	   as	  love,	   intimidating	   in	   its	   instituted	   rhetoric,	   overawing	   in	   its	   endless	   recourse	   to	  emphatics,	   an	   emphatics	   ironically	   mirrored	   in	   the	   triumphal,	   pillaging	  denunciations	  of	   its	  unreason,	   its	   superstition,	   its	  hypocrisy	  yes,	   it’s	  worth	  asking:	  what	   of	   Christianity’s	   judgmentalism	   in	   spite	   of	   itself	   endures	   in	   the	   corrective	  speech	   of	   those	   who	   denounce	   it?	   But	   Bataille	   would	   say,	   Christianity	   is	   not	   the	  point	   in	   itself.	  The	  authoritarian	  violence	  of	  Christianity	   and	   the	   judgmentalism	  of	  the	   enthusiasm	   to	   denounce	   it	   are	   both	   phenomena	   of	   the	   larger	   thing	   that	  subsumes	   them	   both.	   Bataille	   was	   a	   renegade	   from	   a	   religion	   that	   was	   too	  repressive,	  too	  limiting,	  too	  anti-­‐life,	  but	  that	  in	  all	  its	  overweening	  force	  was	  never	  enough,	   in	  denial	   of	   its	   own	   constituting	   excesses,	   because	   it	  was	  nothing	   in	   itself	  but	   an	   exemplar	   and	   thus	   a	   reduction	   of	   a	   larger	   human	   phenomenon,	   what	  was	  most	   ‘generally	   the	   condition	   of	   [what]	   each	   human	   is’,	   humanity’s	   ‘primordial	  condition,	   [its]	   basic	   condition’,	   the	   human	   drive	   towards	   sovereignty	   itself.5	   To	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Bataille,	  Christianity	  is	  not	  to	  be	  evaluated	  except	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  our	  exposure	  to	  the	  force	  and	  lure	  of	  sovereignty,	  that	  which	  draws	  us	  on	  to	  ourselves	  and	  the	  over-­‐reaching	  that	  we	  ourselves	  by	  nature	  are.	  	  Religion	   then	   emerges	   as	   an	   instantiation	   of	   the	   nexus	   of	   violence,	  subjectivation	  and	  truth-­‐dealing	  that	  we	  call	  sovereignty.	  The	  aim	  of	  this	  article	  is	  to	  situate	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	   in	  Bataille’s	  account	  of	  sovereignty	   in	  order	   to	  reveal	  not	   the	  calumny	  of	  sovereignty,	  but	   its	  resistance	   to	   the	   logic	  of	   ideality	  and	  preference	   to	  which	   it	   is	   usually	   referred,	   traditionally	   positively,	   now	   negatively,	   to	   show	  sovereignty	  as	  Bataille	  wanted	  to	  see	  it,	  as	  he	  saw	  transgression,	  not	  as	  something	  to	  advocate	   but	   something	   in	   us	   larger	   than	   will,	   purpose	   or	   comprehension.	  Sovereignty	  exposes	  us	  to	  the	  abyss	  as	  authority,	  an	  authority	  that	  offers	  us	  a	  violent	  and	  thus	  meaningful,	  commanding	  subjectivity	   that	   lures	  us	  on	  but	   that	  we	  cannot	  have.	   Then,	   through	   de	   Rais	   I	   want	   to	   read	   Derrida’s	   account	   of	   Abraham’s	   near-­‐sacrifice	  of	  Isaac	  in	  order	  to	  see	  God	  as	  a	  figure	  of	  this	  violence	  that	  we	  cannot	  have,	  and	   through	   God,	   other	   avatars	   of	   a	   grounding	   sovereign	   violence,	   justice	   and	  democracy.	   —	  ‘Sovereignty	   comes	   first’,	   Bataille	   writes.6	   In	   Bataille’s	   account,	   sovereignty	   is	   the	  primordial,	   fundamental	   human	   quality.	   It	   embodies	   the	   human	   relationship	  with	  the	  world	  of	   the	  physical,	   specifically	   the	  animal	  world	  which	   the	  human	  alienates	  by	  a	  process	  of	  objectification:	  It	   is	  man	   in	  general,	  whose	  existence	  partakes	  necessarily	  of	   the	   subject,	  who	   sets	   himself	   in	   general	   against	   things,	   and	   for	   example	   against	  animals,	  which	  he	  kills	  and	  eats.	  Affirming	  himself,	   in	  spite	  of	  everything,	  as	  a	  subject,	  he	  is	  sovereign	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  thing	  an	  animal	  is.7	  The	  human	  constructs	  itself	  by	  dominating	  the	  animal	  world	  which	  remains	  locked	  in	  thingness.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  human	  frees	  itself	  from	  being	  a	  thing	  itself,	  ceasing	  to	  be	   an	   object	   and	   becoming	   a	   subject.	   Subjectivity	   is	   not	   simply	   identified	   with	  humanity,	   nor	   is	   it	   something	   humanity	   either	   releases	   or	   expresses.	   Instead,	   it	   is	  something	  that	  humanity	  can	  rise	  to—can	  partake	  of—by	  way	  of	   its	  objectification	  of	   the	   world	   of	   things,	   exemplified	   in	   the	   animal	   that	   the	   human	   kills	   and	   eats.	  Subjectivity	  is	  the	  cardinal	  achievement	  of	  human	  self-­‐affirmation.	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Yet	  this	  process	  of	  subjectification	  divides	  the	  human	  from	  itself	  as	  much	  as	  it	  divides	  the	  human	  from	  the	  animal.	  The	  social	  world	  forms	  around	  this	  divide	   just	  as	   readily.	   The	   ‘traditional	   sovereign’	   may	   exemplify	   what	   is	   most	   authentically	  human,	  but	   it	  also	   institutes	  a	  social	  hierarchy	   that	  separates	   the	  aristocratic	   from	  the	  plebeian:	  	  In	   traditional	   sovereignty,	   one	   man	   in	   principle	   has	   the	   benefit	   of	   the	  subject,	   but	   this	   doesn’t	   just	   mean	   that	   the	   masses	   labour	   while	   he	  consumes	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  products	  of	  their	  labour:	  it	  also	  presupposes	  that	   the	   masses	   see	   the	   sovereign	   as	   the	   subject	   of	   whom	   they	   are	   the	  object.8	  Sovereign	   ascendancy	   does	   not	   simply	   rest	   then	   on	   an	   unequal	   distribution	   of	  labour	  and	  property,	  or	  even	  simply	  of	  prerogative.	  The	  sovereign	  is	  established	  in	  its	  social	  ascendancy	  by	  assuming	  subjectivity	  and	  turning	  the	  socially	  inferior	  into	  objects.	   Yet	   those	   humans	   at	   the	   bottom	   of	   the	   social	   scale	   do	   not	   become	   like	  animals.	  They	  recognise	  subjectivity	  as	  the	  thing	  that	  orders	  their	  lives,	  even	  when	  they	  do	  not	  ‘partake’	  of	  it	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  the	  sovereign.	  Subjectivity	  is	  both	  what	  they	   serve	   and	   the	   thing	   to	   which	   they	   aspire.	   In	   recognising	   the	   sovereign,	   the	  ‘individual	  of	  the	  multitude’	  does	  not	  simply	  abase	  himself.	  He	  ‘recognises	  himself	  in	  the	  sovereign’.9	  The	  sovereign	  becomes	  not	  only	  the	  apex	  of	  social	  aspiration	  but	  the	  very	   identity	   of	   ‘inner	   experience’,10	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	   sociality	   itself.	   The	  sovereign	   is	   the	   intermediary	   between	   individuals,	   the	   thing	   that	   binds	   humans	  together	  in	  communication	  and	  thus	  community.	  	  The	   sovereign	   then	   governs	   the	   social	   by	   exemplifying	   individuality.	   This	  individuality	   is	  not	  autochthonous,	  but	   something	   larger	   than	   the	  human	  of	  which	  the	   human	   partakes.	   The	   sovereign	   figure	   channels	   the	   subjectivity	   that	   remains	  always	   in	   excess	   of	   it.	   ‘Traditional’	   subjectivity	   may	   make	   the	   mistake	   of	   vesting	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  human	  individuals	  who	  merely	  figure	  it.	  Sovereignty	  is	  not	  thus	  a	  person	   but	   the	   idea	   of	   itself	   that	   the	   human	   derives	   from	   its	   overcoming	   of	   the	  object-­‐world,	  and	  which	  it	  then	  institutes	  as	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  social.	  	  The	   social	   and	   the	   sovereign	   then	  must	   be	   in	   an	   intimate	   yet	   still	   disjunctive	  relationship.	  The	  social	  is	  organised	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  sovereign,	  an	  idea	  it	  sees	  actually	   literally	   incarnated	   in	   the	  dominant	  social	   individual,	  whom	  the	  multitude	  use	   as	   an	   emblem	   of	   their	   aspiration	   and	   the	   engine	   of	   interrelationship.	   Yet	   this	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figure	   of	   the	   sovereign	   is	   anti-­social.	   It	   guarantees	   its	   own	   social	   ascendancy	   by	  savaging	  the	  social.	  Sovereignty	  is	  the	   ‘negation	  of	  prohibition’,	  the	  confirmation	  of	  the	  social	  by	  way	  of	   the	  rupture	  of	  all	   rule.11	  The	  sovereign	   is	   the	   lodestone	  of	   the	  social	  but	  it	  transcends	  it	  as	  well.	  It	  may	  profit	  from	  the	  world	  of	  labour	  and	  utility,	  which	   indeed	  makes	   its	   extravagances	   possible,	   but	  which	   it	   spurns	   in	   its	   radical	  commitment	   to	   the	   now,	   regardless	   of	   expense	   and	   consequences.	   It	   is	   the	  possibility	  of	  a	  life	  opening	  up	  ‘beyond	  utility’	  and	  ‘without	  limit’.12	  This	  denial	  of	  all	  limits	  reaches,	  of	  course,	  to	  violence.	  Bataille	  writes:	  This	   relative	   alienation,	   and	   not	   slavery,	   defines	   from	   the	   first	   the	  sovereign	  man	  who,	   insofar	  as	  his	   sovereignty	   is	   genuine,	   alone	  enjoys	  a	  nonalienated	  condition.	  He	  alone	  has	  a	  condition	  comparable	  to	  that	  of	  the	  wild	  animal,	  and	  he	  is	  sacred,	  being	  above	  things,	  which	  he	  possesses	  and	  makes	  use	  of.	  But	  what	  is	  within	  him	  has,	  relative	  to	  things,	  a	  destructive	  violence,	  for	  example	  the	  violence	  of	  death.13	  It	  is	  in	  its	  enthusiasm	  for	  death	  that	  the	  sovereign’s	  absolute	  contempt	  for	  limits	  and	  inhibition	   most	   clearly	   manifests	   itself.	   Death	   cannot	   be	   assimilated	   into	   the	  utilitarian	  logic	  of	  the	  workaday	  world.14	  It	  defies	  the	  logic	  of	  individuality	  that	  the	  sovereign	   would	   have	   seemed	   to	   ensure.	   The	   sovereign	   thus	   is	   the	   archetype	   of	  human	  individuality	   in	   its	   freedom	  from	  the	  constraint	  of	   individuality	   in	  an	  open-­‐ness	  on	  death.	  This	   freedom	  manifests	   itself	  not	  simply	   in	  risk	  and	  courage,	  but	   in	  violence	  and	  killing.	  The	  sovereign	  may	  underwrite	  the	  social	  but	  only	  by	  exposing	  the	   social	   to	   that	   which	   transcends	   and	   defies	   its	   most	   fundamental	   rule,	   the	  prohibition	  against	  killing:	  sovereignty	   is	   essentially	   the	   refusal	   to	   accept	   the	   limits	   that	   the	   fear	   of	  death	   would	   have	   us	   respect	   in	   order	   to	   ensure,	   in	   a	   general	   way,	   the	  laboriously	  peaceful	  life	  of	  individuals.	  Killing	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  regain	  sovereign	   life,	   but	   sovereignty	   is	   always	   linked	   to	   a	   denial	   of	   the	  sentiments	   that	   death	   controls.	   Sovereignty	   requires	   the	   strength	   to	  violate	  the	  prohibition	  against	  killing,	  although	  it’s	  true	  this	  will	  be	  under	  the	  conditions	  that	  customs	  define.15	  The	  human	  is	  thus	  exemplified	  in	  the	  sovereign	  which	  is	  a	  figure	  of	  the	  murderous	  violence	  that	  transcends	  and	  threatens	  the	  human,	  a	  violence	  in	  turn	  not	  answerable	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to	   the	   human.	   The	  multitude’s	   hope	   of	   human	   individuality	   is	   grounded	   then	   in	   a	  murderous	  violence	  directed	  against	  it	  and	  of	  which	  it	  cannot	  partake.	  Sovereignty’s	  investment	  in	  death	  is	  not	  merely	  social	  or	  political,	  however.	  Its	  spurning	  of	  the	  real	  world	  of	  utility	  and	  teleology	  brings	  it	  by	  way	  of	  freedom	  to	  the	  nothingness	  that	  transcends	  all	  purpose	  and	  meaning.	  Bataille	  writes	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	   sovereignty	   as	   the	   ‘miraculous	   moment	   when	   anticipation	   dissolves	   into	  NOTHING,	   detaching	   us	   from	   the	   ground	   on	   which	   we	   were	   grovelling,	   in	   the	  concatenation	  of	  useful	  activity’.16	   Indeed,	  sovereignty	   itself	  becomes	  nothing:	   ‘The	  thought	   that	   comes	   to	  a	  halt	   in	   the	   face	  of	  what	   is	   sovereign	   rightfully	  pursues	   its	  operation	  to	  the	  point	  where	  its	  object	  dissolves	  into	  NOTHING,	  because,	  ceasing	  to	  be	  useful,	  or	  subordinate,	  it	  becomes	  sovereign	  in	  ceasing	  to	  be’.17	  In	  exceeding	  the	  world	  of	  utility	  and	  purpose,	  the	  sovereign	  extinguishes	  itself	  as	  a	  real	  thing,	  defying	  ontology	   as	   the	  definitive	   administration	  of	   the	   limit.	   This	   excess	   is	   the	  miracle	  of	  the	   sacred	   to	   Bataille.	   The	   power	   of	   which	   the	   sovereign	   partakes	   is	   the	   extra-­‐ontological	  prerogative	  of	  ultimate	  subjectivity,	  the	  divine.18	  Whatever	  dimension	  of	  human	   individuality	  or	   subjectivity	   that	   is	   available	   to	  me	   is	   the	   slippage	   into	   this	  world	  of	  the	  sacred	  nothingness	  that	  makes	  individuality	  possible	  but	  that	  is	  always	  larger	   than	   it,	   and	   that	   defies	   it,	   by	   revealing	   an	  otherness	   to	  which	   it	   aspires	  but	  with	  which	  it	  can	  never	  be	  simply	  identified:	  ‘What	  is	  sacred	  ...	  is	  for	  example	  myself,	  or	  something	  that,	  presenting	  itself	  from	  the	  outside,	  partakes	  of	  me,	  something	  that,	  being	  me,	  is	  nevertheless	  not	  me	  (it	  is	  not	  me	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  I	  take	  myself	  for	  an	   individual,	   a	   thing):	   it	   may	   be	   a	   god	   or	   a	   dead	   person,	   because,	   where	   it	   is	  concerned,	  to	  be	  or	  not	  to	  be	  is	  never	  a	  question	  that	  can	  be	  seriously	  (or	  logically)	  raised’.	  The	  sign	  of	  this	  defiance	  of	  the	  real	  world	  is	  death,	  which	  is	  ‘the	  appearance	  that	  the	  whole	  natural	  given	  assumes	  insofar	  as	  it	  cannot	  be	  assimilated,	  cannot	  be	  incorporated	   into	   the	   coherent	   and	   clear	  world’.19	  Death	   is	   the	  ultimate	   luxury	   for	  Bataille,	   the	   thing	   to	  which	   individuality	   aspires	   as	   its	   apotheosis:	   ‘this	  miracle	   to	  which	  the	  whole	  of	  humanity	  aspires	  is	  manifested	  among	  us	  in	  the	  form	  of	  beauty,	  of	  wealth—in	  the	  form,	  moreover,	  of	  violence,	  of	  funereal	  and	  sacred	  sadness,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  glory’.20	   —	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What	  can	  be	  made	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais:	  warrior-­‐general-­‐hero	  who	  fought	  beside	  Joan	  of	  Arc,	   yet	   was	   the	   most	   degraded	   and	   disgusting	   child-­‐killer?	   During	   his	   trial	   the	  following	  is	  said	  to	  be	  the	  material	  of	  de	  Rais’	  confession,	  that:	  He	  took	  and	  had	  others	  take	  so	  many	  children	  that	  he	  could	  not	  determine	  with	  certitude	  the	  number	  whom	  he’d	  killed	  and	  caused	  to	  be	  killed,	  with	  whom	   he	   committed	   the	   vice	   and	   sin	   of	   sodomy;	   and	   he	   said	   and	   he	  confessed	   that	   he	   had	   ejaculated	   spermatic	   seed	   in	   the	   most	   culpable	  fashion	   on	   the	   bellies	   of	   the	   said	   children,	   as	  much	   after	   their	   deaths	   as	  during	   it;	   on	   which	   children	   sometimes	   he	   and	   sometimes	   some	   of	   his	  accomplices	  ...	  inflicted	  various	  types	  and	  manners	  of	  torment;	  sometimes	  they	   severed	   the	   head	   from	   the	   body	   with	   dirks,	   daggers,	   and	   knives,	  sometimes	  they	  struck	  them	  violently	  on	  the	  head	  with	  a	  cudgel	  or	  other	  blunt	  instruments,	  sometimes	  they	  suspended	  them	  with	  cords	  from	  a	  peg	  or	   small	   hook	   in	   his	   room,	   and	   strangled	   them;	   and	   when	   they	   were	  languishing,	   he	   committed	   the	   sodomitic	   vice	   on	   them	   in	   the	   aforesaid	  manner.	   Which	   children	   dead,	   he	   embraced	   them,	   and	   he	   gave	   way	   to	  contemplating	  those	  who	  had	  the	  most	  beautiful	  heads	  and	  members,	  and	  he	  had	   their	  bodies	   cruelly	  opened	  up	  and	  delighted	  at	   the	   sight	  of	   their	  internal	  organs;	  and	  very	  often,	  when	  the	  said	  children	  were	  dying,	  he	  sat	  on	   their	   bellies	   and	   delighted	   in	   watching	   them	   die	   thus	   and	   with	   the	  aforesaid	  Corillaut	  and	  Henriet	  he	  laughed	  at	  them,	  after	  which	  he	  had	  the	  children	  burned	  and	  their	  cadavers	  turned	  to	  ashes.21	  How	  many	  children	  did	  he	  kill	   in	   this	  way?	  Hundreds	  perhaps.	  So	  many	   ‘such	   that	  the	  exact	  number	  cannot	  be	  certified’.22	  The	  Western	  fear	  of	  the	  monstrous	   lord	  in	  the	   forbidding	  castle	   into	  which	   little	  children	  disappear	  never	   to	  return	   is	   said	   to	  spring	  from	  the	  story	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais.	  	  Gilles	   de	   Rais	   is	   a	   figure	   of	   ‘sovereign	  monstrosity’	   to	   Bataille.23	  Why?	   As	  we	  have	   seen	   in	   the	  outline	  of	  Bataille’s	   account	  above,	   traditional	   sovereignty	   is	   first	  identified	   as	   a	   phenomenon	   of	   social	   ascendancy:	   ‘he	   is	   not	   just	   any	   man	   in	   the	  world,	  but	  a	  noble	   ...	   the	  nobility	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	   is	   the	  distinguishing	  mark	  of	   the	  monster’.24	  The	  fact	  that	  de	  Rais	  did	  not	  act	  alone,	  but	  enlisted	  a	  network	  of	  servants	  and	   lackeys	   to	   lure	   children	   into	   his	   hands	   showed	   that	   his	   crimes	   did	   not	   seem	  automatically	   to	   repulse	   people,	   because	   they	   were	   after	   all	   simply	   ‘to	   do	   with	   a	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great	  lord	  and	  miserable	  children’.25	  Nobles	  had,	  according	  to	  Bataille,	  ‘every	  chance	  to	  take	  almost	  unmerciful	  advantage	  of	  young	  serfs’.26	  This	   social	   ascendancy	   not	   only	   allowed	   the	   spectacular	   indulgence	   of	   the	  nobility	  but	  it	  required	  it	  and	  was	  defined	  by	  it.	  The	  point	  of	  the	  feudal	  economy	  was	  to	  licence	  the	  wasteful	  splendour	  of	  the	  aristocracy:	  Men,	  on	  the	  whole,	  produce;	  they	  produce	  every	  kind	  of	  good.	  But	  in	  15th-­‐century	   society,	   these	   goods	   were	   destined	   for	   the	   privileged	   class,	   for	  those	   who	   among	   themselves	   can	   devour	   each	   other,	   but	   to	   whom	   the	  masses	  are	  subordinate.	  For	  the	  mass	  of	  men	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  work	  so	  the	  privileged	   class	   can	   play,	   even	   if	   they	   also	   sometimes	   play	   at	   devouring	  themselves	  to	  their	  ruin.27	  That	   hundreds	   of	   children	  would	   be	   at	   the	   disposal	   of	   a	   noble	   lord,	  who	   chose	   to	  destroy	  them,	  simply	  for	  his	  own	  pleasure,	  is	  not	  in	  contradiction	  with	  such	  a	  noble	  system	  in	  which	  unproductive	  squandering	  of	  foods,	  goods	  and	  lives	  makes	  sense.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  de	  Rais	  was	  tried	  and	  executed	  for	  these	  crimes,	  but	  he	  only	  came	  to	  the	  critical	   attention	   of	   authorities	   because	   of	   some	   ill-­‐judged	   threatening	   political	  behaviour,	   in	  which	  he	  stormed	  a	  church	   in	  order	  to	  hold	  hostage	  the	  brother	  of	  a	  political	   rival.	   These	   offences	   against	   political	   enemies	   in	   an	   act	   committed	   in	   a	  church	  building	  and	  therefore	  taken	  by	  the	  church	  as	  blasphemy,	  was	  what	  exposed	  him	   first	   to	   trial.	   That	   he	   could	   no	   longer	   get	   away	   with	   this	   style	   of	   political	  intimidation	  may	  perhaps	  also	  signify	   that	  his	  way	  of	  being	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end.	  Even	  in	  the	  way	  some	  of	  his	  crimes	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  official	  documents	  of	  his	  case,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  sadistic	  murder	  of	  hundreds	  of	  unprotected	  little	  children	  is	  taken	  to	   be	   less	   outrageous	   than	   offences	   committed	   against	   political	   enemies	   and	   the	  church.	  Bataille	  wonders	  if	  he	  would	  have	  got	  away	  with	  the	  murders	  if	  he	  had	  not	  blundered	  so	  badly	  politically.	  	  The	  social	  reality	  which	  allowed	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  to	  commit	  his	  crimes	  exemplifies	  the	   ascendancy	   that	   Bataille	   identifies	   with	   ‘traditional	   sovereignty’.	   Yet	   it	   also	  conforms	   to	   the	   fuller	   account	   of	   sovereignty	   as	   the	   exposure	   of	   the	   human	   to	  violence,	  chaos	  and	  meaninglessness,	  and	  thus	  religiosity.28	  Of	  de	  Rais’	  ‘nobility	  of	  an	  ardour	  respecting	  nothing’,	  Bataille	  writes:	  In	   Gilles’	   eyes,	   mankind	   was	   no	   more	   than	   an	   element	   of	   voluptuous	  turmoil;	   this	   element	   was	   entirely	   at	   his	   sovereign	   disposal,	   having	   no	  
Nick Mansfield—God, Bataille and Derrida	   137 
other	  meaning	  than	  a	  possibility	  for	  more	  violent	  pleasure,	  and	  he	  did	  not	  stop	  losing	  himself	  in	  that	  pleasure.29	  This	   sovereign	   exposure	   to	   that	   which	   exceeds	   sense	   and	   meaning	   in	   a	   violent	  pleasure	  in	  killing,	  makes	  de	  Rais’	  monstrosity	  sacred	  to	  Bataille,	  because	  it	  is	  in	  the	  violent	  bringing	  of	  death	  into	  the	  world	  that	  the	  sacred	  becomes	  visible.	  De	  Rais	  is	  a	  religious	   figure	   to	   Bataille,	   and	   indeed	   de	   Rais	   found	   religious	   ceremonies	  ‘intoxicating’.30	   As	   we	   will	   see,	   even	   his	   murders	   were	   wrapped	   up	   in	   a	   comical	  religious	   experimentation,	   a	   pathetic	   and	   gullible	   necromancy	   in	   which	   he	   was	  fooled	  by	  retainers	  into	  a	  hopeless	  conjuring	  of	  evil	  spirits.	  Bataille	  writes	  of	  de	  Rais:	  ‘he	  doubtless	  developed	  a	   superstitious	   image	  of	   himself,	   as	   if	   he	  were	  of	   another	  nature,	   a	  kind	  of	   supernatural	  being	  attended	  by	  God	  and	  by	   the	  Devil	   ...	   he	  had	  a	  feeling	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  sacred	  world’.31	  To	  Bataille,	  de	  Rais’	  career	  belongs	  then	  to	   Christianity,	   a	   religion	  which	   cannot	   live	  without	   sacred	   violence,	   that	   ‘is	   even	  fundamentally	   the	   pressing	   demand	   for	   crime’,32	   because	   it	   only	   makes	   sense	   in	  providing	  the	  strength	  to	  endure	  violence:	  Gilles	  de	  Rais’	  contradictions	  ultimately	  summarise	  the	  Christian	  situation,	  and	  we	   should	   not	   be	   astonished	   at	   the	   comedy	   of	   being	   devoted	   to	   the	  Devil,	   wanting	   to	   cut	   the	   throats	   of	   as	   many	   children	   as	   he	   could,	   yet	  expecting	  the	  salvation	  of	  his	  eternal	  soul.33	  Gilles	   is	   an	   archetypal	   figure	   of	   Bataillean	   sovereignty	   therefore,	   of	   its	   social	  ascendancy,	  its	  exposure	  to	  violence,	  chaos	  and	  meaninglessness	  and	  its	  immersion	  in	  the	  cruelty	  of	  a	   limitless	  death	  as	  a	  way	  of	  encountering	  the	  sacred.	  Yet,	  even	  in	  his	  sovereignty,	  not	  only	  is	  de	  Rais	  despicable	  and	  repulsive,	  but	  also	  gullible,	  foolish	  and	  laughable.	  We	  should	  not	  be	  seduced	  by	  the	  charisma	  of	  sovereignty,	  or	  by	  the	  enthusiasms	  of	  transgression	  more	  generally.	  These	  are	  not	  things	  simply	  to	  admire	  or	  to	  advocate	  in	  Bataille.	  To	  advocate	  the	  shattering	  of	  values	  is	  impossible	  without	  turning	   shattering	   into	   a	   value	   and	   thus	   repeating	   the	   servility	   it	   is	   supposed	   to	  overcome.	  Advocacy	  would	  also	  reduce	  sovereignty	  to	  a	  realisable	  historical	  project,	  something	   Bataille	   explicitly	   excludes	   in	   The	   Accursed	   Share,	   where	   he	   writes:	  ‘sovereignty	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  form	  history	  would	  realise’.34	  De	  Rais	  may	  be	  sovereign	   in	   his	   abject	   freedom,	   yet	   he	   is	   not	   a	   hero.	   He	   is,	   even	   in	   his	   cruelty,	   a	  ridiculous	   figure,	   a	  warrior	   superannuated	  by	   the	  military	   reforms	  of	  Charles	  VIII,	  which	   made	   his	   kind	   useless.	   His	   arrest	   shows	   that	   his	   style	   of	   behaviour	   was	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becoming	   anachronistic.	   He	   represents	   no	   ideal	   or	   hope.	   Even	   as	   sovereign	   in	   his	  orgiastic	   and	   sacred	   violence,	   he	   is	   a	   fool	   and	   a	   failure.	   What	   does	   his	   sovereign	  failure	   tell	   us	   about	   sovereignty,	   especially	   in	   its	   relation	   to	   religion,	   and	   beyond	  religion	  to	  politics?	   —	  God	  is	  a	  killer	  too,	  of	  course,	  and	  God’s	  battles	  with	  evil	  cause	  many	  deaths.	  It	  is	  not	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  that	  introduces	  death	  as	  the	  meaning	  of	  religious	  subjectivity,	  whether	  that	   subjectivity	  be	   the	  eternal	   life	  available	   to	   the	   redeemed	   fraction	  of	  humanity	  passing	   to	   the	   right	   hand	   of	   God,	   or	   our	   impertinent	   indulgence	   in	   luxurious	  necromancies.	  Yet,	  killing	  is	  God’s	  right,	  a	  right	  that	  doesn’t	  belong	  to	  humanity,	  and	  that	  de	  Rais	  usurps.	  I	  now	  want	  to	  compare	  the	  case	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  with	  that	  of	  the	  patriarch	  Abraham,	  especially	  as	  mediated	  through	  the	  reading	  provided	  by	  Jacques	  Derrida	  in	  The	  Gift	  of	  Death.	  The	  case	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  exemplifies	  the	  ambiguities	  of	  the	  human	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  sovereignty	  to	  which	  it	  aspires	  and	  which	  defines	  it.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  sovereign	  is	  an	  elusive	  and	  illusory	  figure	  who	  seems	  to	  incarnate	  human	  possibility.	   In	  transcending	  the	  practical	  obligations	  of	   the	  diurnal	  world	  of	  purpose	  and	  work,	  the	  sovereign	  is	  the	  asymptote	  of	  human	  aspiration,	  the	  license	  and	   measure	   of	   human	   subjectivity,	   the	   lodestone	   of	   human	   sociality	   in	   its	   very	  defiance	  of	   the	  obligations	  of	   the	   social,	   the	  hero	  of	  human	   life	   and	   freedom	   in	   its	  embrace	   of	   death	   and	   oppression.	   It	   is	   in	   his	   determination	   to	   act	   out	   this	  sovereignty	  that	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  becomes	  so	  monstrous.	  Yet	  the	  riddle	  of	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  is	   that	   what	   makes	   him	   so	   effectively	   incarnate	   the	   heroism	   of	   sovereignty	   also	  makes	  him	  a	  ridiculous	   failure.	  His	  assumption	  of	  sovereignty	  diminishes	  him,	  and	  does	  not	   encourage	  us	   to	  exempt	  him	   from	  culpability	   for	  despicable	   crimes.	  Why	  does	  his	  smashing	  of	  the	  limits	  of	   logic,	  accountability	  and	  practical	  social	  survival,	  his	  self-­‐elevation	  to	  sovereignty,	  his	  human	  attempt	  to	  make	  sovereignty	  livable,	  still	  make	  him	  so	  contemptible?	  It	  is	  these	  questions	  that	  the	  comparison	  with	  Abraham	  helps	  to	  elucidate.	  God	  directs	  Abraham	  to	  kill	  his	  son,	  Isaac.	  Abraham	  sets	  out	  on	  the	  journey	  as	  instructed,	  without	  questioning	  God’s	  will,	  even	  though	  it	  seems	  to	  contradict	  God’s	  own	   pronouncement	   on	   the	   birth	   of	   his	   child	   that	   it	   would	   be	   through	   him	   that	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than	   mere	   obedience	   or	   even	   faith.	   God	   is	   a	   figure	   of	   Bataillean	   sovereignty,	   the	  superhuman	   figuration	   that	   models,	   causes	   and	   guarantees	   subjectivity,	   from	   a	  position	  outside	   conventional	   reason	  and	  meaning.	  This	   arises	  because	   in	  obeying	  God’s	  will,	  Abraham	   is	  plunged	   into	  an	  aporia.	  He	  must	  both	  maintain	  his	   love	   for	  Isaac	  as	  his	   father,	  while	  also	  submitting	  to	  the	  absolute-­‐ness	  of	  God’s	  will.	  For	  his	  obedience	   to	   God	   to	  matter,	   he	  must	   love	   Isaac	   as	   intensely	   as	   ever,	   while	   at	   the	  same	   time	   honouring	   God’s	   rule	   by	   killing	   him.	   His	   commitment	   to	   the	   domestic,	  economic	   logic	   of	   familial	   obligation	   must	   persist	   even	   at	   the	   same	   time	   as	   he	  commits	  most	  strongly	  to	  God’s	  requirement	  that	  this	  familial	  duty	  be	  sacrificed.	  The	  sacrifice	   would	   be	   trivial	   or	   meaningless	   otherwise.	   In	   order	   to	   conform	   to	   the	  ethical	  requirement	  to	  obey	  God,	  he	  must	  fully	  feel	  his	  ethical	  obligation	  to	  protect	  his	  son,	  while	  being	  determined	  to	  kill	  him.	  Derrida	  writes:	  	  The	  two	  duties	  must	  contradict	  one	  another,	  one	  must	  subordinate	  ...	   	  the	  other.	  Abraham	  must	  assume	  absolute	  responsibility	  for	  sacrificing	  his	  son	  by	   sacrificing	   ethics,	   but	   in	   order	   for	   there	   to	   be	   a	   sacrifice,	   the	   ethical	  must	   retain	  all	   its	  value;	   the	   love	   for	  his	   son	  must	   remain	   intact,	  and	   the	  order	  of	  human	  duty	  must	  continue	  to	  insist	  on	  its	  rights.35	  	  Abraham	  must	  thus	  fully	  respect	  the	  ethics	  God	  requires	  he	  destroy	  in	  order	  to	  serve	  another	  ethic.	  Abraham	  must	  be	  completely	   treacherous	   in	  order	   to	  be	  completely	  faithful.	   This	   obligation	   requires	   of	   him	   a	   conformity	   to	   rule	   and	   a	   precarious	  decisionism,	  a	  rule	  that	  marks	  him	  out	  as	  typical,	  yet	  his	  is	  a	  typicality	  simultaneous	  with	  a	  punctual	   singularity,	  a	  decision	   to	  act,	  a	  decision	   that	  must	  be	   taken	  not	  by	  anyone	  anywhere,	  but	  by	  him,	  and	  now.	  This	  contradiction	  installs	  in	  him	  a	  unique	  interiority	  that	  can	  be	  neither	  shared	  nor	  even	  readily	  articulated,	  in	  Kierkegaard’s	  terms,	  a	  secrecy.	  	  This	  secrecy	  is	  his	  conformity	  to	  God’s	  insane,	  unmotivated	  a-­‐logic	  of	  the	  gift,	  in	  this	   case,	   the	   ‘gift	   of	   death.’	   The	   domestic	   logic	   of	   known	   and	   reciprocal	  responsibility	   is	   sundered	   by	   God’s	   asymmetrical,	   unaccountable	   command	   to	  sacrifice	  Isaac,	  against	  all	  ethics,	  even	  against	  God’s	  own	  previous	  pronouncements.	  Isaac	  is	  to	  be	  killed	  now	  before	  he	  can	  be	  the	  father	  of	  generations	  God	  has	  said	  he	  will	  be.	   In	  God’s	   logic	  he	  will	  become	  the	   father	  of	  peoples	  yet	  be	  killed	  as	  a	  child.	  The	  mundane	  logic	  of	  duty	  and	  order,	  or	  fatherly	  care	  and	  responsibility	  is	  shattered	  by	  the	  very	  father,	  God,	  who	  would	  have	  seemed	  to	  command	  it.	  He	  takes	  away	  from	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Abraham	  the	  reward	  for	  his	  piety,	  virtue,	  loyalty	  and	  patience,	  the	  son	  born	  to	  him	  late	  in	  life	  as	  a	  recompense	  for	  all	  he	  has	  endured	  and	  seen.	  Abraham	  must	  conform	  to	   the	   chaotic,	   aporetic	   logic	   of	   God’s	   gift,	   by	  making	   in	   turn	   a	   gift	   to	   God	   that	   he	  cannot	  hope	   to	  understand	  or	   explain.	  Yet,	   the	  absolute	   irony	   is	   that	  God	   restores	  Isaac	  to	  him,	  orders	  him	  at	  the	  very	   last	  moment	  to	  hold	  back	  from	  killing	  his	  son,	  offering	  a	  substitute	  in	  his	  stead.	  This	  is	  the	  double	  insanity	  of	  God’s	  logic,	  not	  only	  must	   the	   obscure	   law	   of	   the	   gift	   overcome	   the	   economic	   logic	   of	   obligation	   and	  return	  which	  Abraham	  had	  been	  living	  in	  his	  piety,	  but	  even	  by	  way	  of	  the	  aporia	  of	  the	  gift,	  Abraham	  will	   still	   be	   rewarded:	   another	  economy	  emerges,	   an	  even	  more	  insane	  Godly	  economy	  in	  which	  not	  only	  must	  Abraham	  give	  up	  everything	  he	  holds	  most	  dear,	  but	  one	  in	  which	  in	  the	  end,	  he	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  keep	  it,	  a	  logic	  in	  which	  he	  both	  sacrifices	  and	  does	  not	  lose,	  what	  Derrida	  calls	  ‘the	  sacrifice	  of	  sacrifice.’	  Yet	   what	   has	   been	   at	   stake	   is	   not	   only	   ethics,	   but	   subjectivity.	   Abraham’s	  commitment	  to	  God’s	  self-­‐contradictory	  will,	  his	  immersion	  in	  secrecy,	  provides	  the	  shape	   of	   his	   subjectivity	   by	   installing	   a	   version	   of	   God-­‐ness	   within	   him.	   Derrida	  writes	  of	  the	  process	  of	  folding	  inwards	  that	  installs	  the	  secret	  world	  of	  conscience	  that	  God	  has	  animated	  through	  this	  drama:	  ‘God	  is	  in	  me,	  he	  is	  the	  absolute	  “me”	  or	  “self”,	   he	   is	   that	   structure	   of	   invisible	   interiority	   that	   is	   called	   ...	   subjectivity.’36	  Abraham	  commits	   to	   this	   subjectivity,	   even	   though	   it	   is	  built	  on	  what	  Kierkegaard	  identified	  as	  absurdity.	  Derrida	  sees	  it	  as	  an	  aporia,	  ‘the	  chaos	  of	  the	  undecidable’.	  	  Human	  subjectivity	  only	  arises	  then	  as	  a	  version	  of	  God’s	  subjectivity	  installed	  within.	  God	  is	  the	  absolute	  self,	  and	  by	  taking	  on	  his	  insane	  logic	  in	  the	  madness	  of	  the	   decision	   to	   sacrifice	   Isaac,	   to	   sacrifice	   fatherly	   obligation,	   domestic	   love,	   to	  sacrifice	  everything,	  Abraham	  can	  act	  as	  a	  self	  acts,	  can	  become	  the	  aporia	  as	  event,	  the	  obscure	  secret	  thing	  in	  action.	  Yet	  the	  relationship	  between	  God	  and	  Abraham	  is	  not	   symmetrical.	   Abraham	   may	   become	   like	   God,	   but	   is	   not	   God	   himself.	   God	  commands,	   then	   changes	   his	   command.	   Abraham	   obeys.	   He	   doesn’t	   make	   the	  decision	  to	  kill	  or	  not	  to	  kill.	  Abraham’s	  decision	  is	  whether	  to	  obey	  God	  or	  not,	  not	  whether	  to	  kill	  or	  not.	  God	  is	  the	  killer.	  It	  is	  God	  who	  scorns	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  domestic	  and	  familial,	  it	  is	  God	  who	  is	  indifferent	  to	  love.	  Abraham	  preserves	  his	  commitment	  to	  all	   these	   things.	  His	  only	  decision	   is	  whether	   to	   subordinate	   them	  to	  something	  higher.	   God	   inhabits	   the	   world	   of	   rupture	   and	   violation.	   It	   is	   God	   who	   exposes	  Abraham	   to	   absolute	   risk,	   by	   bringing	   into	   the	   world	   a	   violence	   that	   Abraham	   is	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incapable	  of	  understanding,	  a	  violence	  constructed	  not	  on	  Abraham’s	  terms,	  but	  on	  God’s,	  a	  violence	  that	  smashes	  all	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  Law.	  Abraham	  can	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  obedience,	  but	  God	  violates	  obedience	  to	  the	  law	  by	  calling	  for	  an	  act	  of	  obedience	   to	   his	   own	   authority,	   an	   act	   of	   obedience	   which	   he	   then	   violates	   by	  interrupting	   it.	   God’s	   ever-­‐renewing	   violence	   is	   not	   itself	   comprehensible.	   God’s	  violence	  is	  limitless	  and	  in	  itself	  beyond	  meaning.	  It	  signifies	  the	  absolute	  alienation	  of	   divinity	   in	   its	   limitless	   terror	   from	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   human.	   God	   may	   install	  subjectivity	  within	  the	  human	  as	  a	  version	  of	  what	  he	  may	  be	  himself,	  but	  he	  always	  exceeds	  and	  confutes	  this	  subjectivity,	  going	  beyond	  it	  into	  a	  dizzying	  limitlessness.	  There	  is	  no	  end	  to	  the	  violence	  he	  can	  do	  to	  the	  human.	  As	  Derrida	  says	  in	  ‘Force	  of	  Law:	   The	   Mystical	   Foundations	   of	   Authority’:	   ‘God	   is	   the	   name	   of	   this	   pure	  violence.’37	  Abraham’s	   subjectivity	   forms	   in	   relation	   to	  a	  divine	  violence	  which	   is	  not	  his.	  He	  cannot	  do	  anything	  other	  than	  enact	  God’s	  violence,	  but	   from	  his	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  violence	   itself	   is	  not	   the	   issue.	  Or	   rather,	   it	   is	  not	  his	   issue.	   It	   is	  not	  his	   role	   to	  evaluate	   the	   violence,	   and	   he	   does	   not.	   His	   enactment	   of	   God’s	   violence	   does	   not	  become	  his	  own	  violence,	  because	  what	  motivates	  him	  is	  not	  violence	  but	  obedience.	  He	  is	  not	  God.	  He	  does	  not	  kill	  the	  child.	  This	  is	  what	  distinguishes	  him	  from	  Gilles	  de	   Rais.	   The	   right	   to	   kill	   the	   child	   does	   not	   belong	   to	   Abraham.	   It	   is	   God’s	   right.	  Abraham	  only	  has	  the	  right	  to	  obey.	  His	  exposure	  to	  God-­‐ness	  elevates	  and	  enriches	  him	  in	  that	  it	  constructs	  within	  him	  the	  dynamic	  of	  the	  secret	  that	  is	  his	  subjectivity,	  but	  he	  does	  not	  become	  the	  pure	  violence	  that	  is	  God.	  His	  subjectivity	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  his	  being	  a	  version	  of	  God-­‐ness,	  but	  also	  on	  how	  much	  he	  is	  not	  God.	  Gilles	  takes	   on	   the	   absolute	   violence	   of	   sovereignty,	   but	   in	   so	   doing	   acts	   like	   he	   is	  sovereignty,	   that	   his	   power	   and	   violence	   are	   limitless.	   The	   absolute	   violence	   of	  sovereignty	  enlarges	  human	  subjectivity,	  but	  only	  in	  that	  subjectivity	  does	  not	  lose	  its	   difference	   from	   that	   violence.	   Human	   subjectivity	   becomes	   possible	   only	   in	   its	  orientation	  to	  that	  which	  exceeds	  and	  transgresses	  it,	  that	  calls	  it	  on	  towards	  what	  is	  larger,	  more	  disruptive,	   that	  violates	  human	  meaning	  and	  destroys	  what	  makes	  us	  secure.	  It	  is	  only	  in	  exposure	  to	  this	  danger	  that	  the	  subject	  can	  live	  the	  dynamic	  of	  self-­‐overcoming	  that	  we	  call	  life.	  If	  the	  human	  loses	  the	  difference	  between	  itself	  and	  that	  which	  exceeds	  it,	  then	  it	  becomes	  its	  own	  excess.	  Yet	  this	  is	  impossible	  because	  something	  cannot	  become	  its	  own	  excess	  without	  cancelling	  excess	  out.	  Gilles	  takes	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absolute	   violence	   on	   himself,	   and	   thus	   loses	   his	   difference	   from	   that	   which	  constitutes	  his	  subjectivity	  by	  exceeding	  him.	  In	  short,	  he	  ceases	  to	  be	  a	  subject	  and	  becomes	  ridiculous,	  of	  no	  consequence	  or	  significance.	  Nothing	  can	  defend	  or	  justify	  him.	  He	   passes	   beyond	   the	   exposure	   to	  meaninglessness	   that	   extends	   subjectivity	  and	   himself	   becomes	   meaningless.	   In	   becoming	   sovereignty,	   he	   loses	   the	  relationship	  to	  sovereignty	  that	  would	  have	  made	  of	  him	  some	  mode	  of	  exemplary	  subjectivity.	   He	   kills	   the	   children	   and	   becomes	   despicable,	   monstrous,	   beyond	  human.	  It	   is	  here	   that	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  Bataille’s	  statement	  about	  Christian	  violence.	  For	   all	   their	   posturing	   about	   love	   and	  peace,	   the	   religions	  of	   the	  book	   require	   the	  violence	   of	   God	   as	   the	   thing	   from	   which	   the	   human	   must	   separate	   itself.	   This	  violence	  arises	  as	  the	  absolute	  possibility	  of	  human	  failure,	  but	  the	  human	  failure	  to	  distinguish	   itself	   from	   violence,	   by	  making	   the	  mistake	   of	   thinking	   itself	   God.	   The	  Christian	  condemnation	  of	  violence	  as	  evil	  is	  not	  the	  pronouncement	  of	  the	  absolute	  separation	   of	   God’s	   ethics	   from	   violence,	   but	   the	   arrogation	   of	   violence	   to	   God	  himself.	   The	  worst	   evil	   a	   human	   subject	   could	   do	   is	   to	   lose	   the	   sense	   of	   distance	  between	  itself	  and	  the	  violence	  God	  is.	  Then	  the	  subjectivity	  that	  this	  violence	  makes	  possible	  becomes	  anchorless,	  free	  floating	  and	  un-­‐ruled.	  Only	  God	  has	  this	  right.	  The	  mistake	   of	   Gilles	   de	   Rais	   was	   not	   to	   imitate	   sovereignty	   but	   to	   act	   as	   if	   he	   had	  become	   it.	   Thus	   he	   became	   nothing.	   Abraham	   lives	   out	   a	   subjectivity	   in	  which	   he	  both	   is	   God	   (in	   the	   instantiation	   of	   his	   subjectivity)	   and	   not	   God	   (in	   that	   Godness	  moves	  within	  him	  without	  him	  actually	  becoming	  God).	  It	  is	  this	  aporetic	  Godly	  non-­‐Godness	   that	  allows	  him	  to	   live	  on	  as	   loving	   father	  by	  withholding	  his	  hand.	  Gilles	  loses	   the	   difference	   between	   himself	   and	   his	   sovereignty.	   He	   forgets	   that	   even	   in	  acting	  sovereignly	  that	  he	  has	  not	  become	  sovereignty	  itself.	  Subjectivity	  sunders.	  —	  We	   are	   talking	   about	   the	   killing	   of	   children,	   perpetrated	   either	   by	   God	   or	   by	   a	  vacuous	  non-­‐self,	  so	  we	  are	  not	  simply	  making	  a	  theological	  point	  nor	  using	  violence	  as	   a	  metaphor.	   Suspended	   timelessly	   in	   the	   twilight	  world	   between	   fairy	   tale	   and	  nightmare,	  the	  terror	  of	  the	  children	  Gilles	  de	  Rais	  killed	  inhabits	  Western	  culture	  as	  the	   epitome	   of	   the	   unthinkable	   still	   widely	   thought.	   This	   unthinkable	   cannot	   be	  erased	   from	   our	   broader	   philosophical	   consciousness	   either.	   To	   Bataille,	   God	  was	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simply	   an	   attempt	   to	   literalise	   or	   personalise	   that	   larger	   phenomenon	   of	   the	  unreachable,	   undefinable,	   unlivable	   thing	   that	   oriented	   human	   subjectivity,	  sovereignty.	   Sovereignty	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   rhetorical	   abstraction	   of	   a	   religious	  consciousness.	  For	  Bataille,	  it	  is	  clearly	  the	  other	  way	  round.	  God	  is	  the	  name	  we	  use	  to	  protect	  ourselves	  from	  the	  sovereignty	  that	  is	  forever	  our	  horizon.	  This	  definition	  of	  sovereignty	  echoes	   in	  Derrida’s	  account	  of	   the	  story	  of	  Abraham,	  but	  also	   in	  his	  discussions	  of	  more	  political	  concepts,	  especially	  justice	  and	  democracy.	  To	  Derrida,	  law	  is	  instituted	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  justice	  that	  is	  always	  larger	  than	  it.	  Law	  attempts	  to	  institute	  justice	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  gains	  whatever	  authority	  it	  has	  by	  its	  evocation	  of	  justice	  and	  its	  perpetual	  attempt	  to	  enact	  it.	  Yet	  the	  law	  will	  never	  be	  just	  enough.	  It	  will	  always	  be	  subject	  to	  reform,	  improvement,	  refinement,	  to	  being	  more	  effective,	  more	  far-­‐reaching,	  a	  purer	  enunciation	  and	  instantiation	  of	  justice.	  In	  this	   way,	   justice	   always	   requires	   more	   of	   law	   than	   it	   is	   capable	   of	   giving.	   It	   can	  always	   challenge,	   harry	   or	   deconstruct	   the	   law.	   It	   thus	   always	   threatens,	  undermines	  and	  violates	   the	   law.	  The	   law	  arises	  only	   in	   this	  perpetual	  violation	  of	  itself	  in	  the	  name	  of	  pursuing	  justice.	  Justice	  arises	  as	  the	  law’s	  violation	  of	  itself	  in	  its	   endless	   quest	   for	   improvement.	   Law	   then	  must	   act	   out	   justice	   but	   if	   it	   became	  justice,	   it	  would	  become	  only	   the	  violence	   that	   it	  does	   to	   itself.	  For	   law	   to	   identify	  with	  the	  absoluteness	  of	  justice,	  it	  would	  thus	  become	  pure	  violence,	  unaccountable,	  unlicensed,	  massacring.	  The	   same	   risk	  arises	  with	  democracy.	  To	  Derrida,	  democracy	  as	   an	   instituted	  political	   system	   is	   always	   oriented	   towards	  what	   he	   calls	   democracy-­‐to-­‐come,	   the	  horizon	   of	   ever-­‐extending	   equity,	   freedom	   and	   openness	   that	   gives	   democratic	  institutions	   their	   orientation,	   justification	   and	  meaning.	  Democracy-­‐to-­‐come	   is	   not	  an	   ideal	  against	  which	  we	  measure	  our	  present	  arrangements,	  nor	   is	   it	  a	  goal	   that	  we	  can	  one	  day	  expect	  to	  realise.	  It	  is	  the	  impulse	  to	  reform	  and	  improve	  always	  and	  forever	   our	   democratic	   values	   and	   practices.	   We	   are	   open	   to	   the	   ever-­‐expanding	  possibilities	   of	   democracy-­‐to-­‐come	   because	   it	   is	   itself	   open-­‐ness.	   Yet	   in	   its	  will	   to	  convert	  all,	  to	  saturate	  the	  human	  world,	  to	  re-­‐model	  all	  societies,	  the	  orientation	  of	  democratic	   actors	   towards	   an	   infinite	   democracy-­‐to-­‐come	   threatens	   to	   become	  another	   unaccountable	   violence.	   A	   loss	   of	   the	   constituting	   aporia	   that	   puts	  democracy	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   democracy-­‐to-­‐come	   that	   gives	   it	  meaning	   but	   that	   it	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must	  not	  become,	  that	  it	  must	  not	  mistake	  for	  something	  realisable,	  risks	  a	  violence	  that	  would	  persist	  beyond	  the	  world	  of	  what	  is	  knowable	  and	  measurable.	  We	  are	  blessed	  with	  the	  misfortune	  of	  aporia.	  Sovereignty	  and	  its	  hypostases—God,	   justice,	   democracy—are	   the	  names	  of	   a	   limitless	   violence	   from	  which	  we	  are	  commanded	  to	  exempt	  ourselves,	  even	  as	  we	  are	  sometimes	  commanded	  to	  execute	  that	  violence.	  In	  this	  complex	  arrangement,	  God	  both	  demands	  and	  forbids	  violence	  in	  one	  and	  the	  same	  act,	  requiring	  violence	  while	  also	  becoming	  a	  figuration	  of	  the	  demand	   for	   absolute	   and	   eternal	   peace.	   The	   same	   can	   be	   said	   of	   justice	   and	  democracy.	   They	   require	   a	   violence	   that	   they	   forbid.	   This	   is	   the	   meaning	   of	  Derridean	  doubleness.	  For	  Derrida,	  aporia	  is	  not	  an	  elegant	  ambiguity,	  nor	  is	   it	  the	  pathos	   of	   ambivalence	   in	   which	   a	   reluctant,	   reflective	   hero	   is	   poised	   between	  incommensurable	  options,	  a	  hero	  who	  is	  to	  be	  enlarged	  and	  intensified	  by	  having	  to	  make	   the	   forward	  move	   into	  decision,	  ever	   reluctantly	   in	  an	  affectation	  of	  worldly	  wisdom.	   In	   doubleness,	   the	   commitment	   to	   peace	   cannot	   be	   other	   than	   the	  confirmation	   of	   the	  meaning	   of	   violence.	   In	   this	  way,	   God’s	   love	   requires	   violence	  and	  would	  be	  nothing	  without	  it.	  How	   many	   children	   did	   Gilles	   de	   Rais	   kill?	   A	   hundred?	   Two	   hundred?	   A	  thousand?	   Nobody	   knows.	   His	   violence	   knew	   no	   limit	   because	   he	   mistook	   the	  sovereign	  logic	  that	  gives	  rise	  to	  subjectivity	  for	  something	  that	  he	  could	  actually	  be.	  In	   this	   way,	   his	   violence	   knew	   no	   limit	   but	   he	   also	   became	   nothing.	   How	   many	  people	   has	   God	   killed?	   Or	   justice?	   Or	   democracy?	   Terrifyingly,	   these	   hundreds	   of	  thousands	  of	  deaths	  matter	  to	  us	  less	  than	  the	  murders	  perpetrated	  by	  a	  single	  mad	  killer.	  They	  have	  less	  weight	  because	  they	  were	  done	  in	  the	  name	  of	  things	  we	  still	  believe	  give	  us	   life	  and	  enlarge	  us.	  These	  gods	  kill	   in	  us.	  That	  a	  person,	  a	  nation,	  a	  culture,	   a	  West	  might	   think	   of	   itself	   as	   democracy	  means	   it	   bears	   its	  God	   into	   the	  desert	  of	  a	  limitless	  possibility	  of	  ever	  extending	  violence	  whose	  primary	  function	  is	  to	  enrich	  a	  subjectivity	  by	  going	  beyond	  it	  in	  a	  promise	  to	  others	  that	  is	  never	  kept.	  That	  God	  would	  be	  the	  name	  of	   this	  abuse	  reveals	  not	  simply	  the	  religious	   logic	  of	  political	   enthusiasm,	   but	   also	   the	   sovereign	   abyss	   which	   these	   eminently	  deconstructible	   terms	   (God,	   religion,	   politics)	   attempt	   to	   simultaneously	   articulate	  and	   conceal.	   The	   sovereign	   will	   to	   enlarge,	   to	   extend,	   to	   enlighten,	   to	   free,	   both	  governs	   and	   threatens.	   This	   is	   the	   aporia	   of	   the	   transgression	   that	   endlessly	  suggests	   a	   violence	   we	   can	   neither	   approve	   nor	   do	   without,	   the	   transgression	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captured	  in	  the	  cross’s	  offer	  of	  redemption	  in	  luring	  into	  the	  world—in	  order	  to	  kill	  his	  own	  child—God	  the	  sovereign	  killer.	   —	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